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The paper explores the two-way links between human
development and economic growth in Latin America.
Economic growth is likely to advance human development
as the resource base expands, while higher human
development generates greater economic growth as healthier
and more educated people contribute to improved economic
performance. Regression analysis shows quite strong
connections from human development to economic growth
in Latin America, but the economic growth to human
development relationship is much weaker than that indicated
by worldwide evidence, probably due to the disruptive
impact of the debt crisis. Case studies of successful and
unsuccessful countries show that human development
success was due to good economic performance combined
with high social expenditure; failures were associated with
conflict, natural disasters and harsh adjustment policies.
Exploration of country behaviour over time confirms that
priority should be given to human development to reach a
virtuous cycle of growth and higher human development.
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I
Introduction
There is a strong case to be made for regarding human
development rather than economic growth as the
ultimate objective of human activity. Human
development has been defined as enlarging people’s
choices in a way which enables them to lead longer,
healthier and fuller lives.1 This is a very broad definition
of human development, and can include a great variety
of choices, for example in the political and cultural
dimensions. In this paper we focus on a narrow subset
of choices –those directed specifically at health and
education– which are among the basic preconditions
for choice in other dimensions. This paper is in the spirit
of much of the work of Al Berry, whose major concern
has been to move beyond growth of per capita income
to focus rather on its distribution, with the objective of
improving the lives of the poor.2
In a previous paper (Ranis, Stewart and Ramírez,
2000), we explored the links between human
development (defined in this rather restricted fashion)
and economic growth, both theoretically and
empirically. Clearly, there exists a strong two-way
connection between the two. On the one hand,
economic growth provides the resources to permit
sustained improvements in human development. On the
other, improvements in the quality of the labour force
constitute an important contribution to economic
growth. While these general connections are readily
accepted, one needs to understand the links in more
depth for this to be of much use in policy formulation.
In particular, one needs to know whether all forms of
economic growth promote human development, or
whether there are particular patterns of economic
growth which are more conducive to human
development; equally, whether all forms of human
development promote economic growth, or whether
there are specific types which are more conducive to
promoting such growth; and whether we can say
anything useful about priorities if a choice is necessary:
for example, should human development be promoted
before economic growth, or can we delay the
achievement of human development while promoting
economic growth?
In order to answer these questions we explored the
theoretical links and then analysed them empirically,
drawing on cross-country data from all developing regions
of the world. The exercise came to quite strong conclusions
about the questions just posed above. In this paper, we
aim to investigate how well our general findings apply in
the Latin American context, and what policy conclusions
are to be derived from the Latin American experience.
The next section of the paper (section II)
summarizes the findings of our earlier work. Section
III presents some econometric estimates for Latin
America, comparing them with the earlier global
findings, and section IV reports on some country cases
in Latin America which have been particularly
successful or unsuccessful. Finally, section V presents
some brief conclusions.
This version was originally presented at the conference in honour
of Professor Albert Berry on ‘The Social and Economic Effects of
Globalization and Liberalization on the Labour Market and Income
Distribution’, organized by the University of Toronto on 19 and 20
April 2002. We wish to express our thanks to Tavneet Suri, for her
outstanding support,  and also to Prateek Tandon for his valuable
assistance.
1 The first UNDP Human Development Report stated that: “The basic
objective of development is to create an enabling environment for
people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives” (UNDP, 1990, p. 9),
and defined human development as “a process of enlarging people’s
choices” (p. 10).
2
 For an early example see Berry and Urrutia (1976); for a much
more recent one, see Berry (ed., 1998).
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II
Human development and economic growth:
findings from the previous study
We view human development as the central objective
of human activity and economic growth as potentially
a very important instrument for advancing it. At the
same time, achievements in human development
themselves can make a critical contribution to economic
growth. There are thus two distinct causal chains to be
examined: one runs from economic growth to human
development, as the resources from national income
are allocated to activities contributing to human
development; the other runs from human development
to economic growth, indicating how human
development, as well as being an overriding objective,
helps increase national income. The two chains are
pictured in figure 1.
1. Chain A: from economic growth to human
development
From a review of the literature on the determinants of
human development, it appears that the main links in
the chain from economic growth to human development
relate to:
FIGURE 1























































Source: Prepared by the authors.
a NGO: Non-governmental  organization.
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a) The distribution of GDP between households and
government, since each performs vital, if different,
roles in generating conditions favourable for
human development. Civil society  –for example,
through community organizations and other NGOs–
also plays a role. These organizations’ share of
national resources depends on the decisions of
government and households on how much to
allocate to them.
b) The distribution of income among households, as
income going to poorer households is more likely
to enhance our restricted concept of human
development (education, health), since deficiencies
are greatest among such households.
c) Households’ propensity to spend their after-tax
income on items which contribute most directly to
the promotion of human development in poor
countries, such as food, education and health
services. A major determinant in this respect
appears to be the share of income controlled by
females.
d) With regard to the government, the allocation of
resources for improving human development is a
function of total public sector expenditure, of how
much of this flows to the human development
sectors, and of the way in which it is allocated
within these sectors. This can be expressed in the
form of three ratios3: the public expenditure ratio,
defined as the proportion of GNP spent by the
various levels of government; the human
development allocation ratio, defined as the
proportion of total government expenditure going
to the human development sectors; and, finally, the
human development priority ratio, defined as the
proportion of total human development sector
expenditure going to ‘priority areas’. The precise
definition of what constitutes a ‘priority area’ varies
according to a country’s stage of development,
rendering this third ratio more arbitrary and
difficult to measure than the other two. Within the
health and education sectors, however, some
expenditures are clearly much more productive in
terms of achieving advances in human
development than others: for example, basic
education, especially in countries at an early stage
of development, is generally recognized to have a
larger impact on human development than tertiary
education.
e) The activities of NGOs or other sectors of civil
society activity are likely to promote human
development. Information on this is more scattered,
but NGO expenditures appear to be typically heavily
oriented towards human development objectives
(e.g. generating incomes for the poor, and school,
nutrition and health projects). In most contexts,
NGOs play a supplemental or even marginal role,
but in a few areas –such as the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) and the Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh, the Harambee Schools in
Kenya and the ‘Comedores Populares’ in Peru, for
example– they appear to represent a major source
of human development enhancement (Riddell et
al., 1995).
f) The effectiveness of these various expenditures in
raising human development levels is, of course, an
important consideration. Expenditures on human
development inputs are clearly not objectives in
themselves, but rather constitute instruments for
achieving advances in various dimensions of basic
well-being. A further important link in Chain A is
what type of measure is most productive at what
level of development, and how different
combinations bring about a change in human
development. We call this link in the chain the
human development improvement function; it
resembles a production function in that it relates
the inputs into human development, such as public
expenditure on health services or potable water, to
the human development objective of achieving
better health.
It is clear from this discussion of the various links
in the economic growth to human development chain
that, in general, we would expect important causal
connections to exist between the economy and human
development achievements, but these connections are
not automatic: the strength of the links in Chain A varies
according to a large range of factors, including the
structure of the economy, the distribution of income
and assets, and the policy choices made.
2. Chain B: from human development
to economic growth
Turning our attention to this second chain, there is
strong empirical support for the view that as people
become healthier, better nourished and more highly
educated they contribute more to economic growth.
More specifically, both micro- and macro-level research
show that:3 See Human Development Report 1991.
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a) Extending primary education raises the
productivity of both rural and urban workers. In
agriculture, education raises productivity among
farmers using modern technologies, with less
impact, as might be expected, among those using
traditional methods.4 Education is also an
important contributor to technological capability
and technical change in industry.
b) Improved health and nutrition have been shown to
have direct effects on labour productivity,
especially among poorer individuals.5 Morbidity
has a negative impact on labour productivity, as
shown, for example, by studies in Ghana and Côte
d’Ivoire (Schultz and Tansel, 1993). In some
contexts the evidence indicates that the productivity
effects arising from health and nutrition are even
larger than from formal schooling, although the
impact of education has been much more
emphasized in the development literature.
c) Secondary education, including vocational,
facilitates the acquisition of skills and managerial
capacity.
d) Tertiary education supports the development of
basic science, the appropriate selection of
technology imports, their domestic adaptation and
the development of indigenous technologies.
e) Secondary and tertiary education represent critical
elements in the development of key institutions in
the areas of government, law and the financial
system, among others, which are all essential for
economic growth.
f) From a macro perspective, the “new growth
theories” aim to endogenize technical progress by
incorporating some of these same effects, with
emphasis on education, learning by doing and R.
and D. A number of empirical studies have shown
the positive effect of education on economic growth
at the macro level, with the size of this effect
varying according to the measure of education and
the particular macro growth model adopted.6
g) Education affects the nature and growth of exports,
which in turn affects the aggregate growth rate. It
has been argued that even ‘unskilled’ workers in a
modern factory normally need the literacy,
numeracy and discipline which are acquired in
primary and lower secondary school (Wood, 1994).
Studies have shown a significant positive
correlation between the growth of manufactured
exports and the growth of GDP.7
h) Education can also affect per capita income growth
via its impact on the denominator, i.e., population
growth. Many studies have shown a negative
correlation between female schooling and fertility
(Ainsworth, Beegle and Nyamete, 1995).
i) Increasing basic education has been shown to lead
to more equal income distribution (Psacharopoulos
and others, 1992, p. 48), and recent studies suggest
that a more equal distribution of assets and income
has a positive effect on economic growth.8 As in
Chain A, the strength of the various links in Chain
B varies and there is no automatic connection
between an improved level of human development
and increases in per capita GDP. Education, health
and nutrition alone, of course, cannot transform
an economy. The quantity and quality of
investment, both domestic and foreign, together
with the overall policy environment, represent
other important determinants of economic
performance. Income distribution again appears to
be important in Chain B, as in Chain A.
3. Empirical findings
Our earlier empirical work used cross-country
regressions covering 35 to 76 developing countries,
according to the availability of data for particular
variables, for the 1960-1992 period. We tested the
following hypotheses, derived from the analysis of
Chain A summarized above:
Human development improvement would be
greater:
A1: the higher the economic growth;
A2: the lower the proportion of the population below
the poverty line; for a given level of per capita GDP,
this means the more equally income is distributed;
A3: the more income households allocate to human
development at a given income level; this may be
related both to the level of female education and
to the extent of female control over income within
the household;
4
 See Schultz (1975), Welch (1970), Rosenzweig (1995), and Foster
and Rosenzweig (1994).
5
 See surveys in Behrman, 1993 and 1996.
6
 For example, Barro (1991) and Barro and Lee (1993 a and b).
7
 For example, Michaely (1977), Krueger (1978), Ram (1985), Rana
(1988) and Edwards (1993).
8
 See Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Alesina and Perotti (1994), Persson
and Tabellini (1994) and Birdsall, Ross and Sabot (1995).
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A4: the higher the proportion of GDP devoted to social
expenditure by the government.
Using the change in human development, proxied
by life expectancy shortfall reduction, 1970-1992, as
the dependent variable, for Chain A we found that:
a) Per capita GDP growth proved significant and quite
strong in all of the equations, with higher growth
of per capita income leading to better human
development performance. According to one
equation, a one percentage point increase in the
average growth rate of per capita GDP was
estimated to reduce life expectancy shortfall by
more than 3 percentage points over the period.
b) The share of national resources going to social
expenditure almost always proved significantly
positive. For every percentage point increase in the
average share of GDP invested in health and
education (lagged), the life expectancy shortfall
decreased by about 1.75 percentage points.
c) The initial female primary enrollment rate had a
significant but small impact on the subsequent rate
of improvement in life expectancy. We attributed
this to the impact on household behaviour of female
income, knowledge and control within the
household.
d) Contrary to expectations, a more equal distribution
of income did not seem to advance human
development.
e) Both the African and Latin American dummies
were negative and significant throughout, as we
might have expected, given that the comparator was
highly successful East Asia. In each case the
coefficient was quite small.
For Chain B, we tested the following hypotheses:
GDP growth would be higher:
B1: the higher human development;
B2: the higher the investment rate;
B3: the more equal the distribution of income.
Using per capita GDP growth, 1970-1992, as the
dependent variable, for Chain B we found that:
a) Measures of the initial level of human development
invariably proved significant, although with low
coefficients.
b) The change in life expectancy (1962-1982) was
positive and significant in all cases but one.
c) The domestic investment rate was always
significant, except when the regional dummies
were included.
d) The lagged income distribution variables virtually
all gave results with the expected sign (i.e., more
equal income distribution is associated with higher
economic growth), and were almost always
significant, except when the regional dummies
were included.
e) Regional dummies for Latin America were
significantly negative in every case and, in one case,
also for Africa.
In summary, the two chains, taken together, showed
a significantly positive effect of economic growth on
human development and a significantly positive effect
of human development on economic growth.
4. Virtuous and vicious cycles and lopsided
development
The existence of two chains linking human development
and economic growth was thus strongly supported by
our results. This means that an economy may be on a
mutually reinforcing upward spiral, with high levels of
human development leading to high growth, and high
growth in turn further promoting human development.
Conversely, weak human development may result in
low growth and consequently poor progress towards
human development improvement.
Following this reasoning, we classified country
performance into four categories: virtuous cycles,
vicious cycles, and two types of lopsidedness, i.e.,
lopsided with strong human development but weak
economic growth (called “human development
lopsidedness”), and lopsided with weak human
development but strong economic growth (“economic
growth lopsidedness”). In the virtuous cycle case, good
human development enhances growth, which in turn
promotes human development, and so on. In the vicious
cycle case, poor performance in human development
tends to lead to poor growth performance, which in
turn depresses human development achievements, and
so on. The stronger the linkages in the two chains
described above, the more pronounced the cycle of
economic growth and human development, either in a
positive or dampening direction. Where linkages are
weak, cases of lopsided development may occur. On
the one hand, good economic growth may not bring
about good human development if, for example, there
are weak linkages such as a low social expenditure ratio;
on the other hand, good human development
performance may not generate good economic growth
if there is a dearth of complementary resources, such
as low investment rates. Such cases of lopsided
development are, however, unlikely to persist. Either
the weak partner in the cycle eventually acts as a brake
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on the other partner, leading to a vicious cycle case, or,
if the linkages are strengthened over time, possibly by
policy change, a virtuous cycle results.
For the purpose of classifying country performance
empirically, we compared the performance of each
country to the average of all developing countries. It is
important to explore how a country moves from one
category to another over time. In our earlier work, both
lopsided categories proved very impermanent. Indeed,
the most interesting finding from this work was that
none of the countries that started as economic growth-
lopsided were able to move from there to the virtuous
cycle category: all fell back to the vicious cycle (poor
human development, poor economic growth) category.
Thus, our previous global analysis suggested that it is
not possible to move to a virtuous cycle via economic
growth-lopsidedness, as this proved a dead end. In
contrast, some countries which started as human
development-lopsided did manage to move into the
virtuous cycle category.
III
The Latin American perspective
The global picture, now extended to 1960-2000, is
presented in figure 2, where the vertical dividing line
represents the average human development shortfall
reduction for the developing world as a whole and the
horizontal dividing line represents the average per capita
GDP growth rate –both weighted by population. This
figure indicates that Latin American countries are
concentrated in the human development-lopsided and
vicious cycle quadrants. This is in sharp contrast to East
Asia, which is mainly in the virtuous cycle category
and Sub-Saharan Africa, which is mainly in the vicious
cycle category. In figure 2, the measure of human
development adopted –the human development index
(HDI*)– is the same as the most recent formula adopted
by the UNDP for its own human development index
(HDI),9 except it excludes the income component, since
9
  The UNDP HDI, as currently constituted, includes life expectancy
at birth, calculated as an index with a minimum of 25 years and a
maximum of 85 years; an education component made up of adult
literacy and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross
enrolment rate; and a measure of real income weighted according
to income level at purchasing power parity (see UNDP, 2001).
FIGURE 2
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Source: Prepared by the authors.
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we do not want income to appear as part of both human
development and economic growth.
The position of Latin America relative to other
regions is due in part to the particularly heavy impact
of the 1980s debt crisis on the region. As is well known,
this decade is often termed the “lost decade”. When we
come to focus on the Latin American countries relative
to each other –particularly in the 1980s– this means
that negative growth performance over that decade is
the norm, so that a country such as Mexico, which had
falling per capita income in the 1980s, may nonetheless
appear in the virtuous quadrant.
When we compare countries across Latin America
for the 1960-2000 period, classified only according to
the region’s average performance (figure 3), four
countries appear in the virtuous category –Chile, Costa
Rica, Mexico and Panama. The majority of Latin
American countries fall in the vicious category, with a
small number in the human development- or economic
growth-lopsided quadrants.
Again, it is enlightening to investigate country
movements over time. Table 1 shows the positions of
the Latin American countries decade by decade. We
classified them, in terms of growth and HDI* shortfall
reduction, into vicious, virtuous, human development-
lopsided and economic growth-lopsided quadrants,
noting how the country classification shifts from decade
to decade. These transitions are based on how countries
fare relative to the Latin American (not the world)
average. We find that countries’ positions fluctuate over
time for a variety of both general and country-specific
reasons. In contrast to the global picture, Latin
American countries move more frequently in and out
of the virtuous and vicious categories. This is partly
due to the smaller number of countries involved and
the greater similarity among countries in a single region,
which means that small changes can lead to switches
in classification, and is also partly because the larger
incidence of exogenous shocks is likely to lead to more
changes of this type.
Most importantly, the Latin American analysis
reinforces our earlier conclusion: that it is not possible
to move from economic growth-lopsided to the virtuous
category. In contrast, countries which are human
development-lopsided are frequently seen to move into
the virtuous category, while countries in the economic
growth-lopsided quadrant tend to return to the vicious
cycle. This has strong implications for the sequencing
of policy, suggesting that, in contrast to the pattern often
advocated, it is not possible to put growth first and worry
about human development later, because this will
actually undermine both growth and human
FIGURE 3













































Average GDP per capita growth rate
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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development. Building up human development,
however, is a viable way of creating conditions for
sustained growth and further improvements in human
development.
It is instructive to investigate the extent to which
our global econometric findings, summarized above,
apply in the Latin American case, both to identify the
robustness of the overall two-way connections between
human development and economic growth, and to
assess the strength of the specific links which make up
Chains A and B. In the Latin American case, we
obviously have far fewer observations to go on.
Consequently, we used data for each decade and for
each country (i.e., pooling time series and cross-
sections). The results are presented in tables 2 and 3.
For Chain A, we examined the shortfall reductions
for both life expectancy and infant mortality as possible
dependent variables (columns 1 and 2 of table 2). In
column 1, we see a positive, although not significant,
relationship between the growth rate and an improved
HDI in the 1960-2000 period, in which human
development improvement is measured by life
expectancy shortfall reduction. Public expenditure on
education10 as a share of GDP at the beginning of each
decade was positively and significantly related to life
expectancy shortfall reduction. In column 2, we see that
female primary enrolment has a positive, and
significant, effect on infant mortality shortfall reduction.
Although we would have liked to include a variable
for income distribution, data limitations meant that this
would have reduced the number of observations by
three quarters.
For Chain B, we found that two different measures
of human development achievement at the beginning
of each period (the literacy rate and the logarithm of
life expectancy) were positively and significantly
related to growth in per capita income. It is noteworthy
that in this chain we found that the dummy for 1990
was negative and highly significant. This is a clear effect
of the debt crisis, showing that human development
achievements did not translate as well into growth in
the 1980s as they did in other decades. The dummy for
TABLE 1
Latin America: Classification of countries according to changes
in human development (HD) and economic growth (EG), 1960-2000
Country 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
Argentina HD-lopsided HD-lopsided HD-lopsided Virtuous cycle
Bolivia Vicious cycle Vicious cycle Vicious cycle Vicious cycle
Brazil EG-lopsided EG-lopsided EG-lopsided Vicious cycle
Chile HD-lopsided HD-lopsided Virtuous cycle Virtuous cycle
Colombia HD-lopsided HD-lopsided Virtuous cycle HD-lopsided
Costa Rica HD-lopsided HD-lopsided Virtuous cycle Virtuous cycle
Dominican Republic Vicious cycle EG-lopsided EG-lopsided EG-lopsided
Ecuador Vicious cycle EG-lopsided Virtuous cycle HD-lopsided
El Salvador Vicious cycle Vicious cycle Vicious cycle EG-lopsided
Guatemala Vicious cycle Vicious cycle Vicious cycle Vicious cycle
Guyana - HD-lopsided HD-lopsided Virtuous cycle
Haiti Vicious cycle Vicious cycle Vicious cycle Vicious cycle
Honduras Vicious cycle Vicious cycle Vicious cycle Vicious cycle
Jamaica Virtuous cycle HD-lopsided Virtuous cycle HD-lopsided
Mexico Virtuous cycle Virtuous cycle Virtuous cycle Virtuous cycle
Nicaragua EG-lopsided Vicious cycle Vicious cycle Vicious cycle
Panama Virtuous cycle HD-lopsided HD-lopsided Virtuous cycle
Paraguay HD-lopsided Virtuous cycle Virtuous cycle HD-lopsided
Peru Vicious cycle Vicious cycle Vicious cycle Virtuous cycle
Trinidad and Tobago Virtuous cycle Virtuous cycle HD-lopsided Virtuous cycle
Uruguay HD-lopsided HD-lopsided Virtuous cycle Virtuous cycle
Venezuela HD-lopsided HD-lopsided HD-lopsided HD-lopsided
Source: World Bank (various years)World Development Indicators; UNDP (various years), Human Development Report.
10
  Used instead of education and health expenditure because of
lack of data.
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TABLE 2
Chain A: Evidence from Latin American experience, 1960-2000a,b
(Ordinary least squares (OLS): dependent variable is the change
in human development over a decadec (e.g. 1970-1980))
(1) (2)
Variable Dependent variable: life expectancy Dependent variable: infant mortality
shortfall reduction shortfall reduction
Per capita GDP growth rate over the decade 3.99 1.23
(e.g. 1970-1980) x 100 (0.83) (0.15)
Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP, 1.23d -0.25
average over the decade (e.g. 1970-1980) x 100 (1.92) (0.22)
Gross female primary school enrollment rate, 1.42 0.17d
average over the decade (e.g. 1970-1980) x 10,000 (0.25) (1.74)
Dummy for 1970’s x 100 0.90 9.80e
(0.41) (2.54)
Dummy for 1980’s x 100 3.22 12.07e
(1.22) (2.63)
Dummy for 1990’s x 100 -0.53 9.32e
(0.23) (2.34)
Intercept x 100 8.89d 5.75
(1.71) (0.63)
Number of observations 76 76
R2 0.095 0.220
Source: World Bank (various years)World Development Indicators; UNDP (various years), Human Development Report.
a
 For example, 1970-1980.
b
 The 1970s is the omitted decade.
c
 Figures in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
d
 Indicates significance at the 10% level.
e
 Indicates significance at the 5% level.
TABLE 3
Chain B: Evidence from Latin American experience, 1960-2000
(Ordinary least squares (OLS): dependent variable is
per capita GDP growth over a decade)a,b,c
Independent variable (1) (2)
Literacy rate, average over the decade 2.54d –
(e.g. 1970-1980) x 1000 (1.92)
Log life expectancy, average over the decade – 3.94d
(e.g. 1970-1980) x 10 (1.80)
Average gross domestic investment (as a percentage of GDP) 4.20 4.54
over the decade (e.g. 1970-1980) x 1000 (1.05) (1.14)
Dummy for 1970’s x 100 -0.45 -2.05
(0.08) (0.36)
Dummy for 1980’s x 10 -3.39e -3.63e
(6.10) (6.03)
Dummy for 1990’s x 100 -8.57 -11.53d
(1.49) (1.75)
Intercept x 10 -0.55 -14.80d
(0.53) (1.72)
Number of observations 84 84
R2 0.414 0.411
Source: World Bank (various years)World Development Indicators.
a
 For example, 1970-1980.
b
 The 1970s is the omitted decade.
c Figures in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
d
 Indicates significance at the 10% level.
e
 Indicates significance at the 1% level.
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1999 was also significantly negative in the Chain B
equations – presumably reflecting the continued impact
of stabilization and adjustment on growth.
Taking the results as a whole, we find that Chain A
appears to be weaker than Chain B in the Latin
American context: i.e., while better human development
leads to higher growth in subsequent decades, growth
rates in Latin America are not significantly related to
changes in human development. This may be partly due
to the importance of the debt crisis in Latin America
and the resulting adjustment requirements, which were
often at the expense of expenditures on human
development, when compared to our global results. In
addition, it appears that variations in the policy setting,
specifically in terms of priority ratios and factors
determining the efficiency of the human development
improvement function, were important in accounting
for differences in human development performance.
This indeed is supported by our account of specific
country experiences, which follows.
IV
Country examples of success and failure in
human development and economic growth
In this section we present thumbnail sketches of three
of the good (virtuous cycle) and three of the poor
(vicious cycle) performers. The aim is to identify
specific circumstances and policies which appear to be
responsible for such outcomes.
Chile is a country which managed good
performance over the whole 40-year period, while
undergoing dramatic changes in political regime and
policy stance.
From the early twentieth century Chile has had a
strong commitment to human development. Already in
1930 three-quarters of the adult population was literate
(Thorp, 1998). In the 1960s, and in the early 1970s
during the Allende administration, progress in human
development was maintained through generous State
expenditures on education and health. By the end of
the 1960s social expenditure amounted to 20% of GDP;
primary education covered 95% of 6-14 year olds, and
81% of births were delivered by professionals
(Raczynski, 1987). Growth in per capita income was
modest (1.6% per annum) over this period and
egalitarian relative to the region as a whole, thus giving
a human development-lopsided outcome.
Pinochet’s political take-over in 1973 heralded
dramatic changes in economic and social policy.
Economic policy change involved a sharp move towards
openness and a reduced role for the State. Over the
next ten years this led to the stagnation of incomes (after
an initial rise) and an increase in unemployment from
6% in the 1960s to more than 16% by the early 1980s.
However, some of the ill effects of this on human
development were offset by major employment
schemes. Income distribution worsened, with the urban
Santiago Gini coefficient rising from 0.47 in the 1960s
to 0.51 in 1978-1982.11  After 1986 the economy grew
rapidly (the highest growth rates in Latin America),
largely fuelled by expanding exports of non-traditional
primary products.
From the 1960s, Chile had an extensive system of
State-run welfare programmes in the areas of social
security, health, and education. In addition, there was
universal access to curative health care and programmes
of preventive care for all expectant mothers, infants,
and children less than six years of age who did not have
access to alternative forms of health care. These
programmes were largely maintained despite sharp cuts
in aggregate social expenditure, which fell from 4% to
2% of GDP between 1975 and 1990. Despite this
reduction, Chile’s human development mostly
continued to improve, due mainly to more effective
targeting, partly achieved through decentralization. In
education, government spending focused on primary
and secondary education and moved away from tertiary;
indeed government expenditure on tertiary education
declined from 38% of total government educational
expenditure in 1980 to 19% in 1990. The government
also developed a number of special programmes and
11
 Riveros (1998). According to Berry (ed., 1998, p. 16), “data on
the distribution of consumption among Greater Santiago households
show one of the largest deteriorations ever recorded statistically in
a developing country” between 1969 and 1978.
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subsidies designed to protect the most vulnerable
members of society, especially mothers and children.
These included a family subsidy for those in extreme
poverty, a supplementary feeding programme for
mothers and pre-school children, as well as programmes
for children who fell below nutritional norms, and a
school feeding programme designed to help reduce
dropouts and repetitions (Raczynski, 1987).  Dropout
rates in government schools declined from 7% in 1977
to 5% in 1984. The decentralization of public health to
the municipalities focused the more restricted health
budget on disease prevention rather than curative
medicine. Infant mortality fell from 73 per 1000 live
births in 1972 to 17 in 1989.
The first ten years of the Pinochet period were thus
not successful in terms of economic growth, but human
development progress was maintained as a result of
better targeting of the reduced social expenditures: i.e.,
a greatly improved priority ratio which led to human
development-lopsided development. The last few years
of the Pinochet regime saw a resumption of economic
growth and a move towards the virtuous category.
The return to democracy in 1990 led to a renewed
expansion in social expenditures and to sustained and
somewhat more egalitarian economic growth. During
the 1990s, Chile’s average growth rate was 4.5% per
annum, compared to 2.1% during the 1980s and 1.2%
in the 1970s. Unemployment was reduced to low levels,
and the public employment schemes could be
discontinued. A progressive tax reform was introduced
which helped finance the rising social expenditures.
Over the 1990-1999 period, expenditure on both
education and health more than doubled. Thus the 1990s
saw Chile enter the virtuous category, with improved
human development supported by increased growth and
social expenditures; the sustained expansion in per
capita GDP was, in turn, greatly facilitated by the
combination of more effective economic policies and
higher levels of human development.
Costa Rica, like Chile, has had a long historic
commitment to human development. By 1950, its
illiteracy rate was only 20%, whereas the overall Latin
American rate was more than 40% (Thorp, 1998). The
decision in 1948 to abolish the armed forces released
resources for social expenditures, which were
consistently relatively high, although subject to cuts in
the early 1980s. In 1988, half of government
expenditure was again devoted to health and education,
with nearly 30% going to priority areas.
In the 1960s and 1970s growth was fairly good (5-
6% per annum). An extended welfare benefit system
had nearly universal coverage. Costa Rica invested
around 6% of GDP in education. Universal primary
school enrolment was achieved, and secondary
enrolment rose to around two-thirds, with 20% of young
people between 20 and 24 in higher education, and
relatively equal female and male enrolments. Adult
illiteracy dropped 8 percentage points in the 1960s, and
by 1980 only 13% of Costa Ricans over ten years old
were illiterate, with the rate dropping still further to
4.5% by 1999.
Improvements on health were rather slow in the
1960s, but then accelerated. About 3% of GDP was
devoted to public health expenditure in Costa Rica in
1960, and by the end of the 1990s this had risen to
more than 5%, much of this increase coming in the
later part of the period.  Life expectancy was 67 years
in 1960, increasing to about 73 years by 1980 and 76
by 1995-2000. Infant mortality rates remained quite
high throughout the 1960s, standing at 68 per thousand
in 1960 and falling slightly to 62 per thousand by 1970,
but this was followed by a significant improvement to
19 per thousand in 1980 and 12 per thousand by 1999.
In Costa Rica, the social sector expenditure cuts
of the first half of the 1980s fell most heavily on priority
areas, with the share of the bottom 40% of households
in educational expenditure falling from 42% in 1980
to 36% in 1986. However, social expenditure recovered
in the second half of the decade. Moreover, the
minimum wage was maintained, income distribution
did not deteriorate, and human development progress
resumed. As a result, a virtuous cycle could be
maintained.
Mexico’s progress in human development came
much later than Chile’s or Costa Rica’s. In 1960 over a
third of the adult population was still illiterate. Mexico
falls into the virtuous category because of its
improvements in human development and economic
growth during the 1960-1999 period. But the absolute
standards attained were still significantly below those
of Chile and Costa Rica. For example, by the end of
the period life expectancy was 67, a little less than the
Latin American average (69) and much lower than
Chile’s (75) and Costa Rica’s (77) (Thorp, 1998).
Until 1970, during the Echeverría administration,
Mexico enjoyed “growth with stability,” and advances
were also made in human development. In the 1970s
growth continued, but it was supported by heavy
borrowing and rising fiscal imbalances. Mexico’s
economic performance was strong throughout the late
1960s and 1970s, when GDP growth averaged about 7%
overall (over 3% per capita), with manufacturing –the
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country’s dominant growth sector– attracting
considerable foreign investment.. Absolute poverty
declined from 76% in 1960 to 45% in 1981, but income
distribution remained at unfavourable levels (Ginis
between 0.5 and 0.6) (Maddison, 1992).
A central pillar of post-revolutionary government
in Mexico has been a strong commitment to human
development. In the 1960s this took the form of
enhanced emphasis on land reform, health, sanitation,
education and nutrition. Educational expenditures
averaged around 18% of total government spending in
the 1970s, while those on health averaged around 5%
(IMF, various years).  Good priority ratios also
contributed, with primary education and vaccination
programmes receiving the bulk of public spending. As
a result, human development improved significantly
between 1960 and 1980: life expectancy rose from 59
to 66 years; infant mortality declined from 74 to 53 per
1000 live births; adult literacy rose from 66% to 83%;
and gross educational enrolment almost doubled, from
106% to 120% for primary school enrolment, from 23%
to 49% in the case of secondary education, and from
5% to 14% at the tertiary level.
The story in the debt-ridden 1980s was very
different. Mexico cut its expenditure ratio, with a
corresponding decline in human development spending,
which contracted by 6% per annum from 1983 to 1988.
Real disposable per capita income fell 5% per annum
over the same period, and there were rising levels of
unemployment, underemployment and poverty. The
share of education in total expenditure dropped by almost
30%, most of the reduction being in primary education
(Friedmann, Lustig and Legovini, 1995). Teacher and
student per school ratios both declined between 1983
and 1988, as did the numbers of medical units, hospital
beds and doctors per capita. Despite its very poor
performance in economic growth and human
development, however, Mexico still did well compared
with the rest of the region, though not by world standards.
After the economic reforms initiated in the late
1980s, the economy performed better, bolstered by
foreign investment following the ratification of NAFTA.
But financial crises in 1994 and 1998 were followed
by economic contraction and social sector cutbacks.
For the decade as a whole, the growth rate per capita
was 1.25% per annum (following a negative average
growth rate in the 1980s). In the early part of the 1990s
there was an increase in the share of GDP going to the
social sectors, and expenditures on education rose by
90% between 1989 and 1993, while those on health
increased by 79%. There was a reduction in general
food subsidies, with a rise in (somewhat ineffective)
targeting. A large-scale programme called PRONASOL
was established to make social expenditure more cost-
effective and foster greater community involvement.
One of its components, called “Solidaridad” contained
a wide range of social programmes, including education
and health, but has been accused of being politically
manipulated by the then ruling party. These factors may
account for the fact that Mexico shifted into the
economic growth-lopsided category in the 1990s. The
programme was renamed PRONOSOL and restructured
in 1995, becoming less political.
In summary, Mexico’s inclusion in the virtuous
category in the 1960s and 1970s was due to its economic
growth and social expenditure. Another element
supporting human development has been the
improvement in gender roles with the greater
institutionalization of women’s rights. The somewhat
inferior performance in human development in the
1990s was probably due to inappropriate targeting,
cutbacks following the crises, and the problems
inherited from the 1980s.
From 1960 to 1970, Jamaica was in a virtuous
cycle, the result of rapid economic growth at more than
6% per annum, combined with a strong government
commitment to human development, with social
expenditures increasing from 5.6% of GDP in 1960 to
12.2% in 1975. Primary school enrolment expanded
from 65% to 85% during the 1960s, while secondary
enrolment rose from 15% to 58%. By 1970, life
expectancy in Jamaica was 68 years and the literacy
rate was 86%, both well above the regional average
(Thorp, 1998). However, severe economic problems and
tough adjustment programmes subsequently led to a
deterioration in human development performance,
pushing Jamaica into the vicious cycle category for
much of the rest of the period.
During the 1970s severe external terms of trade
shocks led to economic contraction, with sharp cutbacks
in social expenditures in order to comply with the
financial recommendations of the IMF. This
deterioration in human development expenditures
continued in the 1980s, with stringent adjustment
policies which included a reduction in real expenditure
on education and health by 30% between 1980 and 1986
(World Bank, 1984). The human development priority
ratio also worsened, though expenditures on tertiary
education were relatively protected. General food
subsidies were replaced with targeted ones, and there
was a deterioration in nutrition. Income distribution
worsened and poverty increased.
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Jamaica’s economy recovered in the latter part of
the 1980s, with a 2.4% per annum increase in per capita
GDP between 1986 and 1990, but this was not translated
into social expenditures, as there was a fall in their share
as a percentage of GDP. However, they recovered in the
early 1990s, when public health expenditures reached
3.2% of GDP in 1995, and public education expenditure
5.4%.
Jamaica continued to be a rather poor performer
on the economic front in the 1990s. Average per capita
GDP growth was negative in the 1990s (about -0.6%
per annum between 1990 and 1999, compared to +0.3%
per annum in the previous decade). However, human
development indicators showed a substantial
improvement in the 1990’s, which may result in future
improvements in Jamaica’s economic growth
performance. By the end of the 1990’s life expectancy
in Jamaica was about 75 years, the adult literacy rate
86%, gross primary enrolment rate 98%, and gross
secondary enrolment rate 90%. Infant mortality was
down to 20 per 1000 live births.
The case of Guyana is similar to that of Jamaica,
only more so, with weak economic performance
undermining human development from as early as the
1960s, subsequently aggravated by adjustment
programmes which included social expenditure cuts.
There was some economic recovery in the 1990s, but
this was not accompanied by substantial human
development improvements.
Guyana started off the period with a relatively low
life expectancy of about 60 years in 1960 and a high
infant mortality rate of about 99 per 1000. After
independence in 1966, there was an initial period of
significant growth in GDP and in social expenditures.
For example, education expenditure grew by over 60%
in the 1970-1975 period, and health spending rose by
over 40%. Primary and secondary enrolment rates also
increased. In the 1970s, the government greatly
expanded its ownership of the economy, and an
estimated 80% of the formal sector was under
government control. Near-permanent economic crisis
followed  the early expansion, due to a combination of
external circumstances (worsening terms of trade) and
internal mismanagement. Between 1975 and 1983, the
decline in GDP exceeded the previous expansion.
Growth in per capita GDP over the 1970s as a whole
averaged about 0.7% per annum. In the 1980s, external
crises and internal mismanagement continued; the
government takeover of the bulk of the retailing and
distribution systems was associated with large declines
in productivity. Rationing of foreign exchange and
import controls led to shortages of production inputs,
and the poor state of the infrastructure further
handicapped the economy, which regressed in the
1980s, with an annual fall in per capita incomes of 3.9%.
The cumulative loss in GDP over the 1980s was 28%.
The crises also led to cuts in social expenditures, which
fell as a proportion of total government expenditure.
In 1988 expenditure on education constituted only 6.4%
of total government expenditure and expenditure on
health 3.7%.
In the 1990s, macro policies changed as the
government liberalized foreign exchange regulations,
lifted price controls and import prohibitions and
encouraged private investment. This was followed by a
growth spurt: in the 1990s, per capita GDP grew at an
average annual rate of 4.2% between 1990 and 1999
(well above the regional average). However, human
development still lagged behind: life expectancy in
Guyana in 1999 was only about 64 years (compared
with a regional average of about 70 years) and infant
mortality rates continued to be high at about 57 deaths
per 1000 live births (compared with a regional average
of 31). However, public expenditures on health and
education began to show some improvement as from
1990: public expenditure on health was about 9% of
GDP by the end of the decade and public expenditure
on education reached 8% of total government
expenditure.
Nicaragua’s experience falls into three distinct
periods: the Somoza era, covering the 1960s and 1970s;
the Sandinista revolution and subsequent government,
which was accompanied by continuous civil war; and
the post-war period of the 1990s. Nicaragua was one
of the last countries in Latin America to make any
substantial progress in human development. Over half
the adult population was illiterate in 1960, and life
expectancy was only 47 years (Thorp, 1998).
During the Somoza era there were high rates of
growth, but this was very unequally distributed. The
Somozas themselves owned or controlled 60% of
national economic activity. And social expenditure was
low as well as unequally distributed. By the late 1970s
only 65% of primary school age children were enrolled
in school and only 22% completed the full six years of
primary education. Three-quarters of the rural
population was illiterate. Infant mortality rates were
around 100 per 1,000 live births. Between 1965 and
1975 the number of children under five suffering from
malnutrition doubled, at a time when GDP also doubled.
Economic growth was sharply disrupted by the
revolution of 1979, with GDP shrinking by a quarter in
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that year. The Sandinistas had a strong commitment to
expansion of social expenditures and to improving the
distribution of assets and incomes. In the early years of
their regime, in 1980 and 1981, GDP jumped by 5%,
and there was a big expansion in social expenditure
and social service coverage. The proportion of GDP
spent on primary and secondary education doubled, and
adult illiteracy was reduced from 50% to 23%. The
health sector expanded greatly, with an emphasis on
preventive and primary care, targeting the principal
causes of infant, child and maternal mortality, providing
broader coverage, and eliciting higher levels of
community participation. In both health and education,
therefore, there were favourable priority ratios. Both
health and education outcomes showed improvements:
Nicaragua’s life expectancy in 1980 was about 59 years
(compared to 47 years in 1960) and gross primary
enrolment was about 94% (compared to 66% in 1960).
However, GDP dropped every year from 1984
to1990, with a cumulative drop of over 40% for the
decade, as a consequence of the civil war, the US trade
embargo and the reluctance of foreign banks to invest.
Inflation spiralled, and the situation was further
aggravated by natural disasters, including hurricanes and
drought. By 1990 per capita income was below that of
the 1970s, and in the ensuing decade per capita GDP fell
by 4.1% per annum.
The economic collapse and disruptions caused by
the war eventually undermined the social sectors,
despite the Sandinistas’ efforts. The literacy rate, for
example, fell back to the levels of the late 1970s, and
the infant mortality rate, which had gone down to 63
per 1000 during the early Sandinista years, began to
rise again and reached 72 per 1000 in 1989.
The post-war era of the 1990s was dominated by
debt and adjustment problems, as well as natural
disasters, including a drought and hurricane. Economic
recovery never really got under way, and social
expenditures were subject to cuts. In the 1990s growth
rates of per capita GDP were barely positive, at 0.3%
per annum between 1990 and 1999.
In summary, the Somoza years illustrate how
good economic growth can fail to translate into
human development when it is badly distributed,
with unequal income and asset distribution and low
social expenditures accompanied by poor priority
ratios. In contrast, the Sandinista period greatly
improved human development initially, by better
distributed and higher levels of social expenditure,
but this was negated by the effects of the civil war,
the embargo and natural disasters. The post-war
era suffered from the problems of war debt,




The Latin American region as a whole has been marked
by relatively high levels and improvements in human
development compared with the global developing
world average during the period from 1960 to 2000,
but its performance in terms of economic growth  has
not been so good. Latin American life expectancy at
the start of the period, in 1960, was substantially higher
than in the rest of the developing world. This may well
be due to the region’s much earlier political
independence and consequently greater commitment
to human development, particularly for the elite. At the
same time, it was the region with the highest degree of
inequality in income distribution (Berry, 1998).
Our efforts to estimate the strengths of various links
in Chains A and B indicate that the links from economic
growth to human development (i.e., Chain A) are more
variable in Latin America than those we found on the
world scene. The social expenditure ratio holds up well,
but GDP growth did not systematically translate into
human development improvement in a significant way,
indicating that there were country-specific
circumstances which affected the strength of the chain.
The links in Chain B, running from human development
to economic growth, on the other hand, showed
themselves to be closer to the global results, with initial
human development levels significantly affecting
economic growth. For both chains we were constrained
in what we could test because of the more limited
country data availability for some variables and fewer
country observations.
Our country cases illustrate how specific
circumstances influenced the strength of various links
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in chains A and B. We studied three countries which
fell in the virtuous quadrant over the period taken as a
whole (Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico), and three which
fell into the vicious quadrant (Guyana, Jamaica and
Nicaragua).
With respect to the three successful cases, high
growth accompanied by high social expenditure ratios
translated into human development improvements, as
in  Mexico in the 1960s and 1970s, and Chile in the
1960s. An alternative path to success, illustrated by
Costa Rica, involved moderate and relatively well
distributed growth, accompanied by very high social
expenditure ratios, with good priority ratios. Chile in
the middle period (1975-1990) illustrates a third path
to success, characterized by very well targeted social
expenditures, with uneven growth for much of the
period and only moderate social expenditure ratios.
Later, Chile fell into the high growth and good social
expenditure ratio category.
There are clearly also many paths to failure. Growth
accompanied by very poor distribution of both private
income and social services served to weaken chain A
substantially in the case of Nicaragua during the
Somoza period. Severe economic shocks and a failure
to protect social sectors during adjustment accounted
for the relative failure of human development in Jamaica
in the 1980s, in Guyana for much of the period under
consideration, and in Nicaragua during the 1990s. Civil
war and a trade embargo were also important in
undermining human development improvement in
Nicaragua in the 1980s, while natural disasters were a
problem in every decade. Heavy external debt,
accumulated as a result of war in the case of Nicaragua,
also stymied human development efforts in post-war
Nicaragua and in Guyana in both the 1980s and 1990s.
Exploration of how countries behaved decade by
decade (see table 1) confirms the view, reached earlier
on a global basis, that human development must
necessarily be promoted in order to reach a virtuous
cycle of growth and human development improvement.
No Latin American country moved from an economic
growth-lopsided position to a virtuous position. Our
regressions for Latin America tell the same story: i.e.,
human development improvements do lead to economic
growth improvements, although in this case economic
growth improvements did not systematically generate
advances in human development. Our regional findings
therefore also contradict the usually recommended
policy sequence, namely, that growth should be
generated first, and that human development will
naturally follow. Ending on an optimistic note, the
recent surge in social sector expenditures in Latin
America in the 1990s may well pave the way for
improved growth in the present decade, in contrast with
the cuts of the 1980s, which handicapped both growth
and hence also human development.
(Original: English)
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